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Six months apart, the Supreme Court decided its first cases
involving the rights of public employees to criticize government
policy' and of draft registrants to obtain court review of Selective
Service classifications prior to induction.' The imminent juxtaposi-
tion of these two important decisions could hardly have been fore-
seen at the time. Yet there was already pending in the federal dis-
trict court a case that would intertwine in most curious fashion
the rights of government employees and draft registrants. Deci-
sions in this case, both on preliminary motions3 and on the merits,
4
afford an occasion for analysis of two rapidly burgeoning fields of
public law.
The facts can be summarized briefly at the outset.5 Stephen
Bruce Murray joined the Peace Corps in the spring of 1965 and
began serving immediately after graduation from college. He there-
upon received from his draft board an occupational (II-A) defer-
ment from military service, supplanting his II-S student deferment.
After his training period, Murray was sent to Concepcion, Chile, to
teach music at the University. Just before his departure, he checked
with his draft board to make sure that his deferment would carry
him beyond his twenty-sixth birthday in November, 1967.1 The
* A.B., A.M., LL.B., Harvard University. Professor of Law, University of Cal-
infornia, Berkeley.
1 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2 Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.
No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
3 Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969).
4 Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969).
5 Many of the facts emerged during the trial, and are drawn in part from sum-
maries of testimony appearing in N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1969, § 1, at 12, col. 4; Sept.
21, 1969, § 1, at 29, col. 1;Oct. 5, 1969, § 1, at 65, col. 4; and Dec. 25, 1969, § 1, at 1,
col. 4, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
6 There was in fact considerable uncertainty about the precise expected termination
date of the Peace Corps appointment. Although the complaint alleged that the tour of
duty would end in January 1968, the preliminary argument revealed a terminal date
as early as October 1967, which would have preceded Murray's 26th birthday. The
court resolved the ambiguity in Murray's favor, however. Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F.
Supp. 688, 692 n.2 (D.R.I. 1969).
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clerk assured him that his present status would continue, although
his initial deferment would expire in June, 1967.
Life in Chile was relatively quiet until the spring of 1967. As
a result of growing concern about the Vietnam War, a group of
Peace Corps volunteers circulated among their colleagues a petition
calling for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and immediate
peace negotiations. The United States Ambassador promptly
warned the authors that the planned publication of the petition
would result in their expulsion from Chile and possibly from the
Corps as well.
When his turn came, Murray signed the petition, finding in it
an accurate reflection of his own views on Vietnam. A few days
later, a letter from the Director of the Peace Corps was read orally
to all volunteers in Concepcion, warning that signers of the petition
risked "administrative discipline" and probable expulsion. Murray
asked for a copy of the directive, but his request was denied. He
argued unsuccessfully with the local Peace Corps director about
the underlying policies and the implications of such an admonition.
Declining to remove his name from the petition or resign from
the Corps-the two alternatives officially suggested to him-Mur-
ray composed a letter to the New York Times setting forth his
view of the controversy and its probable effect on the Corps.7 The
7 The full text of the letter is sufficiently important to an understanding of the




I am writing this letter in regard to the recent directive read to me,
which has been issued about the right of Peace Corps Volunteers to dissent
in the realm of the United States government's international policies. As I
understand it, we are not allowed, as Peace Corps Volunteers and hence
representatives of the U.S. government, to express opinions contrary to U.S.
policy either in speech or writing. This applies in particular to a recent
petition circulated among PCVs in Chile asking for a halt to the bombing
in Viet-Nam and a beginning to negotiations, which was destined to be
printed in the New York Times if a certain number of signatures could be
obtained.
The directive from the Peace Corps, which had to be transmitted to
volunteers orally for fear of having it printed and the possibility that it
could be read by anyone besides a PCV, states that if a volunteer finds this
policy erroneous, he should resign, and if be does not resign, appropriate
measures will be taken. Presumably, the appropriate measures are ejection
from the Peace Corps. I, for one, do not accept this policy, but I will not
resign. I am prepared to meet the consequences.
I wish to make clear in my letter my reasons for rejecting this policy.
First, in regard to politics, I completely agree that the volunteer should not
meddle in the politics of the host country, but I do not feel that this applies
to the international politics of the U.S. which may be of interest to the host
country. The volunteer, although a representative of and paid by the U.S.
government, does not, upon entrance into the Peace Corps, automatically
forfeit any of his rights under the First Amendment. Nor does any other
1029
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letter charged that the directive deterring signers of the petition
"had to be transmitted to volunteers orally for fear of having it
printed and the possibility that it could be read by anyone besides
a PCV [Peace Corps Volunteer] . . . ." While making clear that
he thought it inappropriate for volunteers to "meddle in the politics
of the host country," Murray maintained that such constraints
were inapplicable to "international politics of the U.S. which may
be of interest to the host country." The letter further argued that
public expression of dissent from American foreign policy was
protected by the first amendment and was generally allowed to
other federal employees. The letter continued that the author's
effectiveness as a volunteer was compromised by restrictions on his
ability to communicate effectively with citizens of the host country:
"I find it a contradiction for the Peace Corps to try to suppress
any part of the personality of the volunteer and I shall not tolerate
any such suppression."8 Finally, the letter reaffirmed Murray's
refusal to remove his name from thepetition, whatever the conse-
quences.
After the Times had declined to print the letter, Murray sub-
mitted a Spanish translation to a Chilean daily, El Sur, which pub-
lished the full text and a photograph of its author. Copies of the
English text had meanwhile been sent by Murray to the regional
directors in Chile, and forwarded by them to Peace Corps Director
Jack Vaughn in Washington. One of the local directors had dis-
employee of the U.S. government forfeit such rights. Furthermore, working
for the U.S. government does not put the employee under any obligation to
guard his silence in respect to a government policy with which he does not
agree. Also, the First Amendment does not restrict a person from using the
position in which he is employed, be it PCV or any other form of employ-
ment, on a petition or any other form of protest.
Part of the job of a PCV is to give an opportunity to citizens of a
foreign country to know an American citizen in all the varied aspects of
his personality including his thoughts on important issues. The better under-
standing that can result from this interchange of ideas can be a great factor
in leading to peace in the world. I find it a contradiction for the Peace Corps
to try to suppress any part of the personality of the volunteer, and I shall
not tolerate any such suppression.
In conclusion, I wish to state that I continue to oppose the war in
Viet-Nam, both as an individual and as a PCV. I do not want my name
stricken from the petition I have signed, and I am prepared to sign others in
what may be the vain hope that some form of protest can lead quickly to a
peaceful conclusion to a cruel, and in my opinion, unjust war.
The following statement by William Douglas is, I think, an apt closing
to this letter.
'There is no free speech in the full meaning of the term unless there is








cussed the matter with Murray at some length before the letter
appeared in El Sur.
While conducting the university orchestra the following Mon-
day afternoon, Murray was interrupted with a message that the
regional director wished him to report at once. The director told
Murray that he was being recalled to Washington for "consulta-
tion." Since there was no mention of possible termination or even
change of assignment, Murray left most of his belongings in Con-
cepcion and took the first plane for Washington. Upon arrival at
Dulles Airport, he was met by a Peace Corps officer, who told him
to write his Newport address rather than Chile on a baggage claim
form because, "you've been terminated."' 9 This was the first indica-
tion Murray had of any dissatisfaction with his services. ° (It later
9 N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1969, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
10 The Peace Corps' views on dissent had already attracted considerable attention
at home. Early in June the New York headquarters of the American Civil Liberties
Union began receiving complaints from volunteers in Chile that official pressure was
being applied by the embassy and the State Department to discourage signatures on
the petition. ACLU Executive Director John DeJ. Pemberton sent strongly worded
telegrams to President Johnson and to Peace Corps Director Vaughn urging that vol-
unteers in Chile be informed "that they are free to sign the petition in question and
that the government intends no intimidation in the exercise of their First Amendment
rights." The telegram also announced that the ACLU would furnish counsel to any
volunteer dismissed or penalized for refusal to heed official warnings against signing
the petition. American Civil Liberties Union, Press Release No. 279, June 13, 1967.
(Reports received by ACLU in New York indicated that volunteers were read a mem-
orandum from Peace Corps Director Vaughn asking for the withdrawal of signatures
and recommending that volunteers who refused to withdraw their names should
resign from the Corps. Most of the signers had refused to comply.)
It is quite unclear what rule or regulation precipitated Murray's discharge.
No provisions of the governing statute appear to restrict activities of this sort by
Peace Corps volunteers. One who enrolls in the Corps is required to take an oath
and to swear that he does not advocate the overthrow of the government and is not
a member, with knowledge of the illegal aims, of an organization that advocates the
overthrow of the government. 22 U.S.C. § 2504(j) (1964). The statute does authorize
the President to promulgate regulations governing the "terms and conditions of the
enrollment, training . . . and all other terms and conditions of the service of
volunteers . . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1964). But the regulations do not deal
directly with dissent or protest. Probably the most apposite provisions are those
governing political activity, which simply note the applicability to Peace Corps volun-
teers of the Hatch Act, and explain that "[tihese restrictions do not affect the right
of employees to express their personal political opinions, so long as they do not
take an active part in political campaigns or management or to participate in the
activities of national or State political parties to the extent that such participation
is not proscribed by law." 22 C.F.R. § 301.735-4(a) (1969). The regulation notes
that the Foreign Service Act "prohibits any Foreign Service employee from (1)
corresponding in regard to the foreign affairs of any foreign government, except
with proper officers of the United States, and (2) recommending any person for
employment in any position of trust or profit under the government of the country
to which he is detailed or assigned." 22 C.F.R. § 301.735-4(d) (1969). One other
regulation provided that no employee may "submit for publication any writing the
contents of which are devoted to the Peace Corps' programs or to any other matter
which might be of official concern to the U.S. Government without in advance
1970]
UCLA LAW REVIEW
turned out that the regional director had in fact recommended ter-
mination and knew at the time he summoned Murray from the
orchestra rehearsal that he would be dismissed.)
Meanwhile, the executive director of the Newport draft board
telephoned Murray's mother (who knew nothing of these events)
to say that her son was on his way home. When Murray called a
few hours later, he discovered not only that his imminent arrival
was no surprise to his mother, but that a notice of reclassification
(from II-A to I-A) was already on its way to Concepcion. It later
developed that the draft board had taken this action at least ten
days earlier-two days after the original letter was dispatched to
the Times."
Murray learned on September 11 that his internal appeal from
the reclassification had been rejected and that he was to report for
induction early in October. He promptly consulted ACLU lawyers
in New York. With their help he prepared an application for
exemption as a conscientious objector, but the local board sum-
marily refused to reopen the classification to consider its merits.
When Murray appeared at the center on October 16, he refused to
submit to induction. Early in January he was indicted for refusing
induction.
Immediately thereafter, the ACLU attorneys brought suit on
Murray's behalf against the Director of the Peace Corps, the state
and local Selective Service officials and the United States Attorney
for the District of Rhode Island. The complaint alleged that the
dismissal and the reclassification independently violated Murray's
clearing the writing with the Executive Secretary." 22 C.F.R. § 301.735-6(c) (3)
(1969).
Apparently the official reprisals for the antiwar petition rested not on any of
the foregoing provisions but rather on an admonition found in the Peace Corps
Handbook: "With respect to both United States domestic issues and our Govern-
ment's foreign policy, you are free to express your views to your co-workers and to
other Americans. Be sure, however, that in doing so you do not leave the impression
that you are speaking on behalf of the Peace Corps or the United States Govern-
ment. Since the identification is virtually impossible to avoid when the forum is
a public one, the Peace Corps asks that you avoid discussing political issues, either
United'States or host country, through host country news media or at public gatherings.
You may express your views on United States issues in the American press or by
petitioning United States Government officials using, if you wish, your Peace Corps
identification." See N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1969, §1, at 13, col. 1.
11 For a detailed summary of the intricate facts surrounding this aspect of the
case, see Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, 1044-45 (D.R.I. 1969). Although
the plaintiff had alleged a conspiracy between the Peace Corps and the Selective
Service System to punish him for his expression of dissent, and that issue was re-
served in the preliminary rulings, the court eventually found such a claim incredible
in view of the close proximity between the sending of the first letter and the
termination of the deferment.
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constitutional rights, and that there had in addition been collusion
between the two responsible government agencies to penalize Mur-
ray's expression of dissent. The suit requested appropriate relief,
including an injunction against the imminent criminal prosecution,
reinstatement in the Peace Corps and restoration of the occupa-
tional deferment.
The case was under advisement for some months following
preliminary argument. In June, 1969 the district court denied mo-
tions to dismiss, finding jurisdiction as to all matters and setting the
case down for trial in the fall.' 2 A seven day trial took place in
September and October. On Christmas Eve the court reached a de-
cision on the merits, finding in Murray's favor on all counts. 8
The preliminary opinion ruled on two matters of most imme-
diate concern here-the validity of Murray's dismissal from the
Peace Corps and the availability of pre-prosecution review of the
draft reclassification. These holdings were reaffirmed following the
trial. In addition, the court held that both the Peace Corps and
the Selective Service System had failed in critical respects to follow
the procedures prescribed by their own regulations. 4 Although no
substantial evidence existed of conspiracy or collusion between the
Peace Corps and the Selective Service-the deferment having been
withdrawn before news of Murray's letter could possibly have cir-
culated through inter-agency channels-the court concluded that
"had Murray not been terminated from the Peace Corps, he would
have received, upon request, a II-A occupational deferment for the
12 The preliminary ruling also disposed of-in fact devoted substantial emphasis
to-several difficult procedural issues that will not be discussed here. These initial
barriers included proof of the requisite amount in controversy, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1964); entitlement to relief against the arguably "discretionary" acts of federal
officials, under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964); and the power of a court of equity to
enjoin a criminal prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). See Murray v. Vaughn,
300 F. Supp. 688, 694-96, 696-97, 702-03 (D.R.I. 1969).
Is Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969).
14 For discussion of these procedural errors and irregularities, see text accom-
panying notes 16-18 infra. In view of the failure of the Peace Corps to adhere to
its own regulations, the court found it unnecessary to decide an important and novel
question raised by the complaint-whether a Peace Corps volunteer is constitutionallly
entitled to a hearing and to accompanying procedural safeguards before being dis-
missed. As the court recognized, in declining to reach the question: "The minima
required by due process in the context of a termination from Peace Corps service
has [sic] never been decided. Because such a decision would . . . require a searching
analysis of various agency procedures, and would reach to the frontiers of consti-
tutional development, I am reluctant to carry it out at the trial level, in a case
such as the instant one where it is clear that the involved agency has violated its own
regulatory framework for termination." 307 F. Supp. at 1052. For a recent and
hesitant suggestion that a public employee may be constitutionally entitled to a




remainder of his Peace Corps service.""la Even if such a request
were not granted pro forma, pursuit of available internal remedies
would presumably still have enabled Murray to reach his twenty-
sixth birthday, thus permanently removing the threat of military
service before he could be inducted. Thus proof of collusion or
conspiracy was unnecessary to find that the acts of one agency had
unlawfully exposed Murray to the reach of another from which he
should have been immune.
There were, moreover, a number of serious irregularities in the
procedures of both agencies. The Peace Corps, in violation of its
own regulations or policies, had failed to apprise Murray of his
termination while he was still in the field; had never informed him
of the content of the charges; had not told him of his right to retain
counsel and to challenge or refute the adverse inferences by con-
fronting his accusers and in other ways; and had not invited him
to prepare his own statement of the case prior to his terminal inter-
view with the Director. Though each of these transgressions may
have appeared slight by itself, the court concluded that "the fun-
damental wrong which weaves itself throughout the whole fabric
of Murray's termination was that there was no opportunity for
vigorous and fully informed adversarial confrontation on the issues
raised . . .. I
If the conduct of the Peace Corps was bad, that of the draft
board was worse-at least procedurally and functionally the more
egregious of the two administrative performances. Although the
notice sent to Murray so stated, the court found that in fact no vote
was ever taken on his initial request to reopen. This constituted a
clear violation of Selective Service regulations. Moreover, the
handling of the request for a conscientious objector exemption "in
the face of a classic and clearly stated prima facie claim" provided
15 307 F. Supp. at 1048. The court relied in large measure upon the long ex-
perience of cooperation between the Peace Corps and the Selective Service with
regard to deferment of volunteers. Testimony by the Selective Service Liaison Officer
of the Peace Corps disclosed that of more than 20,000 volunteers who served be-
tween 1961 and 1969, only eight entered Peace Corps service with a II-A deferment
that was terminated prior to the scheduled end or actual conclusion of volunteer
status. No volunteer lost his deferment under these conditions before the fall of
1967. Moreover, no volunteer from Rhode Island had ever been inducted prior to
the conclusion of Peace Corps service.
This general impression of the relations between the two agencies was reinforced
by specific testimony of the only member of Murray's local board who appeared
at the trial. Under persistent cross-examination, he admitted "that the fact of whether
or not Murray was in the Peace Corps in summer of 1967 was central to the board's
consideration of Murray's request for occupational deferment in July and August
of 1967." Id.
16 Id. at 1053.
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additional evidence of "procedural lawlessness" by the board." A
confidential memorandum adverse to the C.O. claim had been in-
cluded in the file without notice to Murray and was later improp-
erly removed contrary to Selective Service rules. Finally, the
board's refusal to reopen the case in October to consider the merits
of Murray's nonfrivolous request for an exemption violated other
applicable regulations.'
On the basis of these findings the court: ordered the Peace
Corps to recompute and augment Murray's reassignment allowance
(a retroactive reinstatement after the expiration of his original
term of duty); ordered the draft board to readjust his file so as to
show a II-A classification from the date of the withdrawal in 1967,
and to cancel the induction order; and enjoined any further prose-
cution of the indictment for refusing induction.'
9
II. A PROSPECTUS: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
GOVERNMENT BENEFITS
Murray v. Blatchford20 raises two central constitutional
issues: the extent of protection for protest and dissent within the
public service, and the availability of judicial review of an allegedly
lawless draft classification prior to induction or prosecution. Some-
thing must be said at the start about the unique juxtaposition of
these two issues. Murray was the recipient and holder of two im-
portant government benefits-a position in the Peace Corps, and a
temporary exemption from military service. Since the granting of
the deferment was based entirely upon his service as a volunteer,
we might designate the deferment as the secondary benefit and the
Peace Corps position as the primary benefit. The case is intriguing
because the withdrawal or cancellation of the primary benefit
brought about the termination of the secondary benefit.
The interdependence of two valuable government benefits is
hardly unique to the Murray case. Frequently the termination of
one beneficial status will bring about the loss of another-a stu-
dent is expelled from a state university and thereupon loses both
his federal fellowship2 and his draft deferment; a city employee
17 Id. at 1057.
18 Id. at 1053-57.
19 Id at 1059. In Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 694-703 (D.R.I. 1969),
the court bad already resolved various procedural and jurisdictional doubts about
the propriety of issuing such mandates.
20 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I. 1969).




is fired and the next day is evicted from the low-rent housing
project provided for municipal workers; a lawyer is disbarred by
the state courts and automatically loses his right to practice before
the federal court in the same state. In each case it is essential to
untangle the threads in order to assess the options (and the ob-
stacles) facing the beneficiary who suffers two blows because of a
single act.
Naturally the beneficiary will start by trying to recover the
primary benefit. If he succeeds, the restoration of the secondary
benefit may follow automatically if its withdrawal was an auto-
matic result of the primary forfeiture. It may suffice simply to
notify the agency or official responsible for dispensing the second-
ary benefit that the primary status has been restored. However,
restoration is often uncertain, for although termination of the sec-
ondary benefit may indeed have been an automatic or reflexive act,
the secondary benefactor may now be unwilling to reverse its
position without an independent review of the claimant's eligi-
bility. Alternatively, it may decide that the beneficiary is a bad
risk for the future, and that its constituency would be better
served by not taking a second chance.
If the secondary benefactor declines to restore the status quo
ante, the next step is litigation. Where the decisions and acts of the
benefactor are readily reviewable, a restoration order may follow
promptly. But if-as is far more often the case with government
benefits-the dispensing judgment is either discretionary or other-
wise insulated from court review, the beneficiary may be unable
to obtain complete redress no matter how wrongful or improper
the original forfeiture.
The question then arises whether the particular circumstances
of the case-the special relationship between the two benefits-
militate sufficiently in favor of judicial review to overcome obsta-
cles that would ordinarily be preclusive. The argument for review
is compelling, for example, where the termination of the primary
benefit has been held to abridge the beneficiary's first amendment
rights, or to have violated due process. The case is less substantial
but still persuasive where constitutional rights are not implicated
but where the primary agency has simply acted lawlessly (e.g., in
disregard of its own rules), or out of error or mistaken judgment.
Here the beneficiary cannot fully regain the status to which he is
legally entitled simply by getting back the primary benefit. Unless
a court will hear his plea for restoration of the secondary benefit
as well, his grievance remains substantially unredressed. And in
some cases, restoration of the primary benefit without the second-
1036' [Vol. 17:1028
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ary may even be futile-if, for example, the wrongfully expelled
student has meanwhile been drafted or cannot remain in school
without financial aid; or if the municipal worker cannot afford
housing except in the civic project; or if the improperly disbarred
attorney has a principally federal court practice.
The Murray case poses the problem of interdependent govern-
ment benefits most acutely for three reasons: first, because Mur-
ray's claim to restoration of the primary benefit rests on very firm
constitutional ground; not only have first amendment liberties of
expression and association been abridged, but procedural due
process has arguably been denied. Second, judicial review of ter-
mination of the secondary benefit is unusually elusive; Congress
has raised a very high barrier by a recent law permitting federal
courts to review Selective Service reclassifications only in criminal
prosecutions for refusing induction.22 Third, the restoration of the
primary benefit without resumption of the second would be a
hollow victory indeed: it would do Murray little good to be assured
during basic training or while enroute to Vietnam that he was
wrongfully removed from the Peace Corps and thus should never
have lost his deferment.
Unless he can persuade a court to consider both claims (while
protecting him equally from induction and prosecution) the vindi-
cation of his primary claim will be meaningless. Thus the critical
issue of the case is whether a finding in Murray's favor on the first
count will suffice to carry the second claim over the very high juris-
dictional threshhold that Congress has erected. The answer to the
second question demands a careful answer to the first. Accordingly
we begin by analyzing the scope of a public employee's constitu-
tional right to engage in protest and to criticize national or agency
policy.
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND POLITICAL PROTEST
A. The Special Case of the Peace Corps Volunteer
Before reaching the constitutional issues, brief attention must
be given to two threshhold problems, peculiar to Peace Corps type
activities, not consideied by the district court. Initially, there may
be some doubt whether one who serves in the Peace Corps can
claim the legal safeguards now afforded public employees. He is de-
nominated a "volunteer"23 and receives only nominal compensation
22 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
23 22 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1964).
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for his service. 2' Arguably, therefore, he should receive only di-minished constitutional protection or none at all.
There is, however, a dispositive case to be made for a defi-
nition of public employment broad enough to ensure the Peace
Corps volunteer the full panoply of constitutional safeguards. 25
First, he does in fact receive both monetary and non-monetary
benefits of substantial value.26 Moreover, to stress the quid pro
quo of the relationship by looking at salary and the like really
misses the basic point. Even if Peace Corps service were wholly
gratuitous-indeed, especially if it were-there would be cruel
irony in denying to one who serves without remuneration the con-
stitutional safeguards now assured to those who work for govern-
ment at competitive salaries. While there may be incidential or
part-time jobs to which these protections do not properly apply,
the reason for suspending them would almost invariably be the
discretionary character of the appointment rather than any lack
of reciprocity in the arrangement. And even if volunteering a few
hours a week does not constitute true "government employment,"
the same can hardly be said of one who devotes his full time for a
year or more to the service of his government overseas. As though
to confirm this view, the regulations governing the Peace Corps
fully subject volunteers to the conditions, restrictions and limita-
tions by which most federal civil servants are bound.27 Thus there
is little doubt that Congress intended Peace Corps service to carry
24 22 U.S.C. § 2504(c) (1964) ("readjustment allowances").
25 For a survey of those safeguards, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Van
Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inap-
propriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751 (1969); Linde, Justice
Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector,39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 31-46 (1964); Comment, The First Amendment and Pubbic
Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right To Be A Policeman?, 37 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 409 (1968); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFoLK
L. REV. 380 (1969).
26 22 U.S.C. § 2504(c) (1964) ("at a rate not to exceed $75 for each month of,
satisfactory service as determined by the President.") Although such compensation is
noncompetitive with salaries for other government positions, and the living allowances
are modest, the opportunity to travel and to serve in exotic foreign lands wouldby themselves constitute sufficient consideration to make the relationship one of
mutual benefit. (Travel and transportation allowances are covered by 22 U.S.C.§§ 2504(b) (1964)). In addition, there are incidental or fringe benefits of considerable
value-various forms of insurance on health and life (22 U.S.C. §§ 2504(d), (e), (f)(1964)), a government commitment to pay any legal costs incurred in the course of
official duty (22 U.S.C. § 2504 (1) (Supp. IV, 1969)) and a program of counselling
for career choice upon return to stateside civilian life (22 U.S.C. § 2504(k) (1964)).
27 22 C.F.R. § 301.735-13 (1969). The statute stipulates that "except as provided
in this chapter, volunteers shall not be deemed officers or employees or otherwise in
the service or employment of, or holding office under, the United States for any
purpose." 22 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (1964).
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with it rights commensurate with those responsibilities, even
though the draftsmen deliberately used the term "volunteer" for
reasons more emphatic than euphemistic.
More importantly, any suggestion that a volunteer cannot
claim the constitutional safeguards of public employment insidi-
ously revives the ghost of the long interred distinction between
"rights" and "privileges" in the law of government benefits. It is
manifestly impossible to draw a line which differentiates activities
and interests that merit constitutional protection from those that
do not. Some benefits are of much greater importance than others,
of course. And courts may properly decline to review claims to
denial or uneven distribution of certain types of governmental
gratuities. Yet there is no benefit so insubstantial that it can be
encumbered or distributed in any way whatever-for example, by
being denied to Blacks or Jews or Catholics, or offered only on
condition that the recipient give up his right to worship or to
vote.2" Thus to ask whether a Peace Corps volunteer is paid enough
to make him a government employee is to raise an argument that
can be readily dismissed; but it is also to ask the wrong question
altogether, and to pose the issue in a dangerously misleading way.
Today we know enough about the law of government benefits to
avoid the trap.
A second threshhold matter may be easily resolved. The Gov-
ernment originally argued in Murray that judicial review was in-
appropriate or even unavailable because Peace Corps volunteers
serve "at the pleasure of the President"2 9 and are thus subject to
summary dismissal, for reasons good or bad, by the Peace Corps
Director who is the President's delegate.30 The argument was but-
tressed a bit by a suggestion that the foreign relations power was
somehow implicated, and that courts should thus be even more
inclined than usual to keep hands off. Though the claim received
but brief attention in the preliminary opinion, the district court
gave the correct and sufficient reply. If the use of terms like "at
the pleasure of the President" sufficed to insulate discharge and
dismissal decisions from judicial review, then even the most fla-
grant violation of constitutional rights might lie beyond the reach
of the courts unless civil service or tenure statutes furnished chan-
nels of review. Employees who had not yet attained that degree of
job security could thus be dismissed at the political, racial or re-
ligious whim of a superior and would be without recourse of any
28 Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
29 22 U.S.C. § 2405 (i) (1964).
30 22 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (1964).
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kind. Courts have consistently rejected this notion in analogous
contexts31 and no governmental interest advanced in the Murray
case warrants a special immunity for the Peace Corps.
B. The Public Employee's First Amendment Right to Criticize
The right to criticize or protest government policy is a special
component of a rapidly evolving and expanding body of constitu-
tional law. The time was, not so long ago, when courts still accepted
the view of Mr. Justice Holmes that a man "may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no right to be a police-
man. 3 2 As recently as 1952, the Supreme Court upheld New
York's loyalty-security law on the pretext that workers who did
not like disclaimer-type oaths were always "at liberty to retain
their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."33 The underlying
premises, which died hard, were that public employment was some-
how a "privilege" rather than a "right"-a notion which gave the
employer unlimited power to dispense or withhold; and that since
government agencies possessed the "greater" power to deny em-
ployment to an applicant, they could with impunity exercise the
"lesser" power to offer civil service positions on any conditions
they wished.
These fallacies have finally been put to rest by clear recog-
nition of the damage that may be done to first amendment liberties
by the conditioning of such an important benefit. The Supreme
Court has declared in recent cases that "public employment may
[not] be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights
which could not be abridged by direct government action." '34 While
declining to classify public employment as a "right" or "privilege",
the Court has insisted that the undoubted governmental power to
refuse to create jobs or to hire a particular applicant may not be
used to stifle expression or political activity.35
81 See, e.g., the following cases dealing with public employment: Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11 (1966). See also Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967), dealing withpublic housing; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), dealing with unemployment
compensation; and Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), dealing with state-supported higher education.
See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Comment, Another
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
82 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
38 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
84 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
85 See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); United States v. Robel,389 U.S. 258 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
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This rapid evolution of legal protection for the liberties of the
public worker has naturally left lacunae. One special problem, fre-
quently before state and lower federal courts, has been the scope
of a government employee's right to criticize government policy or
the acts of his superiors.36 That question eventually reached the
Supreme Court through the cases of two public school teachers
discharged because of sharply critical and allegedly false public
statements they had made about school administration policy. Both
state courts had sustained the dismissals without probing the con-
stitutional questions very deeply.37
In Pickering v. Board of Education,38 the Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded both cases. An opinion by Mr. Justice
Marshall answered the immediate question-the extent of consti-
tutional protection from reprisal for false statements about the
policies of one's own agency-but left many others unresolved. On
the particular issue at bar, the Court agreed that a public employee
should be treated no more harshly than a member of the general
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). For more general comments, see Israel, Elf-
brandt v. Russell-The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 193 & materials
cited note 24 supra.
Meanwhile, the courts of several states have built even tighter safeguards for
the government worker. The California Supreme Court, most notably, has insisted that
governmental restrictions on the political liberties of civil servants be justified. by a
demonstration: "(1) that the political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement
of the public service; (2) that the benefits which the public gains by those restraints
outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) that no alter-
natives less subversive of constitutional rights are available." Bagley v. Washington
Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d 409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr.
401, 403 (1966). See also Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d'559, 421 P.2d 697, 55
Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385,
38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
Apart from or beyond the cases, scholars and commentators have sought to develop
even firmer protection for the rights of public employees. Professor Hans Linde has,
for example, argued that restrictions on government employment should be valid or
invalid, depending upon whether government could compel private employers to im-
pose the same restrictions and conditions on their workers. Linde, Justice Douglas
on Liberty in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 40 WASH.
L. REv. 10, 75-77 (1965). Recently Professor William Van Alstyne has analyzed and
taken issue with Professor Linde's test, although he concurs in the importance of
expanding the essential guarantees of liberty in the public sector. See Van Alstyne,
The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate
Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 751 (1969).
26 See, e.g., Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Swaaley v. United
States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Rosenberg v. Allen, 258 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) ; Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, 246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966);
Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1962)
Klein v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1147, 152 N.W.2d 195 (1967). For a very
recent case along the same lines, see Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851
(5th Cir. 1969).
87 Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1967); Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 36 Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
38 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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public whose similar statements might subject him to civil liability
for defamation. That is, dismissal could be justified only by "proof
of false statements knowingly or recklessly made" by the public
employeeR9 The Court was to a perceptible if uncertain degree in-
fluenced by the relationship between the teacher and the content
of the statements: since none of the accusations pertained to mat-
ters about which the teacher had special knowledge, and since they
contained no attacks upon named colleagues or superiors, "the fact
of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in
the subject matter of the . . . communication ... 2 0 The Court
left open the possibility of different disposition of a number of
cases involving arguably stronger governmental interests.
Clearly the Pickering decision was limited to situations in
which a government agency discharges an employee for false at-
tacks on official policy or conduct. The case did not purport to deal
with reprisals for the unauthorized release of statements that are
accurate-although a footnote suggested that "the need for con-
fidentiality . . . [might be] so great that even completely correct
public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dis-
missal."'" Situations fitting the supposition can readily be imag-
ined: an agency is about to launch criminal investigation, and a
member of the staff leaks advance notice to the press. A compro-
mise is effected which has the most sensitive implications for
foreign policy, and the inside story is carelessly or maliciously
given to a reporter before the treaty is signed. Drastic changes are
made in the penultimate version of a budget before submission to
the legislature, and copies of the earlier document are publicly
distributed. A law clerk tips his friends off about the result of a
forthcoming decision so they may speculate profitably in the stock
market. In countless situations, strong governmental interests de-
mand confidentiality and secrecy. But before a breach of these
interests will warrant a sanction so drastic as dismissal, two re-
quirements seem appropriate: first, that there be a specific rule or
regulation defining the scope of confidentiality and secrecy; and
second, that the unauthorized or premature disclosure be shown
in each case to impair the operations of the agency quite substan-
tially-perhaps even to the extent of a clear and present danger.
It is equally clear that Pickering does not touch the case of
the public worker who attacks the policy of his government or his
superiors in terms that are neither true nor false because they con-
39 Id. at 574.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 570 n.3.
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vey opinions and judgments rather than facts. Most internal criti-
cism of the Vietnam War policy is of this type. Such attacks may
well contain statements that seem susceptible to proof of truth or
falsity. Yet closer analysis suggests the inappropriateness of apply-
ing such a test. If a government employee charges that the United
States pursues an "immoral and unlawful" policy in Southeast
Asia, or is in fact the aggressor, or is supporting a puppet govern-
ment in Saigon against the wishes of the majority of the Vietnam-
ese people, etc., it would surely be unsound to rest his fate upon
his ability to demonstrate the truth-or the government's capacity
to prove the falsity-of each of these charges. Similarly, the use
of pejorative epithets-public name-calling and worse-may im-
pair the dignity, if not the morale and the efficiency, of the civil
service. But the issue of truth has no place in judging the appro-
priateness of censure or discipline.
A more pertinent inquiry would rest upon the relevant govern-
ment interests that may warrant sanctions against such an em-
ployee. The Murray case itself is illustrative: the letter that led to
Murray's dismissal did contain a few statements of fact amenable
to a test of truth-for example, the allegation that the Peace Corps
directive had to be transmitted orally for fear that a printed docu-
ment might reach unfriendly hands. But the bulk of the letter
consisted of opinion, judgment, and criticism about Peace Corps
policy-hardly the sort of material that one could profitably call
"true" or "false." The much more relevant issue in such cases is
whether and to what extent government agencies may censure state-
ments that are critical and possibly damaging because of the
strength of the opinion or of the rhetoric rather than because of
any distortion of the truth.
1. Maintaining the Efficiency, Morale and Discipline of the
Public Service
The strongest case for censure is one in which a subordinate's
accusations seriously jeopardize the efficiency, morale or discipline
of the agency. In Pickering, the Court expressly distinguished
charges and accusations which might make it impossible to main-
tain "either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among
co-workers ... 42 Three criteria must be reviewed in applying this
precept: the content and character of the statements; the relation-
ship between the critic and the object of the criticism; and the
relationship between the critic and his sources of information.
42 Id. at 570.
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a. Character or Content of the Statements. In the Pickering
case Mr. Justice Marshall suggested that "a teacher's public state-
ments... [might be] so without foundation as to call into question
his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom."' A worker
might in any of several ways indicate through his charges or accu-
sations his unsuitability for the position he holds. The first and
most obvious instance would be the one Justice Marshall presum-
ably had in mind-where the statements depart so far from the
truth, reflect such critically poor judgment or reveal such deep-
seated hostility toward the critic's superiors that they go to the
core of the employee's suitability for his job.
The character of the statements might also be highly relevant
if they called for insurrection or revolt against the agency or its
administrative officers. Two California cases suggest the applica-
tion of this criterion. In 1960, Pranger v. Break44 sustained the
discharge of public employees who had made critical and possibly
inflammatory statements to the press during a salary dispute. In
contrast, the court six years later in Belshaw v. City of Berkeley,45
ordered the reinstatement of a Berkeley fireman discharged for
sending the local newspaper a letter criticizing the disparity be-
tween firemen's and policemen's pay scales. The second court
found the two cases readily distinguishable because statements in
the first case seemed to incite "a sit-down or strike or other un-
lawful pressure" which would be illegal and seriously disruptive.4 6
48 Id. at 573 n.5.
A very recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia suggests the application of this governmental interest. The case, Gold-
wasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), concerned a civilian instructor
employed by the Air Force to provide English language training to foreign officers
who were guests of the United States Government as Lackland Air Force Base.
After several warnings against using his classroom for discussion of controversial
political subjects, he was dismissed for making two particularly sensitive statements-
one to the effect that "those who burned themselves to death as a protest against
the Vietnam war are the true heroes, and he wished he had the courage to do it
himself"; the other "that Jews are discriminated against in America, and that he
had felt such discrimination throughout his life, including his service at the Language
School." Id. at 1171. Goldwasser brought suit in the district court seeking review
df his discharge, but was denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed over the dissent
of Chief Judge Bazelon. Writing for the majority, Judge McGowan distinguished
Pickering in part because the statements involved there took place out of class,
while the statements for which Goldwasser was discharged had all been in-class,
on-the-job comments. Moreover, the court stressed that Goldwasser had deviated
from his assigned pedagogical task to the extent that he discussed politics and inter-
national relations rather than the English language: "Appellant's observations on Viet
Nam and antisemitism would appear to have, at best, minimal relevance to the im-
mediate classroom objectives." Id. at 1177.
44 186 Cal. App. 2d 551, 9 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1960).
45 246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966).
40 Id. at 497, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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Where declarations of a government worker constitute such a
threat to the order and integrity of the public sector, discipline
might well be warranted. But the concession is inapposite to Mur-
ray, where none of the statements could be read as urging action
by anyone but the author.
b. Position of the Speaker in the Public Service. Equally
pertinent is the position the critic holds in the governmental hier-
archy. The opinion of the Court in Pickering clearly indicated the
strength of the governmental interest in regulating statements "di-
rected toward any person with whom [the critic] would normally
be in contact in the course of his daily work. . . .I The prospect of
subversion of "discipline" and "harmony among co-workers" ap-
peared to vary inversely with the distance between the accuser
and the accused.
A recent federal court of appeals decision, Meehan v. Macy,"8
nicely illustrates the point. The case involved non-native police
officers in the Canal Zone who publicly expressed their opposition
47 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968).48 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968). While the facts of Meehan are suggestive, the
soundness of the result has been seriously questioned by Pickering and other sub-
sequent cases. A recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals on strikingly
similar facts reflects a more sensitive approach. The case, Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r
of Baltimore, No. 149, Sept. Term, 1969 (Md. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1970), involved apolice officer who had appeared on a local television program and made statements
highly critical of the administration of the police force. He charged, inter alia, that
department morale "hit its lowest ebb, right now"; that "the men feel right now
they are completely lost from the public"; and that "the bottom is going to fall out
of this City." The trial judge sustained a one-year suspension of the officer, noting
that these statements were especially dangerous to department morale and efficiency
because they closely followed the April, 1968 riots and attendant public criticism of
law enforcement agencies.
The court of appeals reversed the suspension, relying heavily on Pickering and
attempting to distinguish Meehan. Noting that none of the statements in question
were alleged to be false, the court found no basis for the inference "that the ut-
terances were in fact corrosive of confidence in the police department and tended to
widen the breach between the police and the public . . . ." Further, neither thedepartment nor the, disciplinary board "made any findings which would support the
State's right to inhibit or hamper Brukiewa's right to speak freely on matters of
public importance, particularly matters as to which he had experienced expertise."
The proper test to be applied in such a case placed "the burden . . . on the State
to establish that public utterances make the utterer unfit for public service or ad-
versely affect public services to a degree that justifies their restriction."
Although the Maryland court did attempt to distinguish Meehan in terms of the
substance of the statements, the more pertinent consideration was that Meehan's
"reasoning and philosophy are not in accord" with New York Times and Pickering.
Moreover, an unreported en banc decision of the District of Columbia Circuit, after
Pickering, had vacated the earlier judgment and remanded for further consideration




to the Governor's decision to bring more Panamanians into the
police force. Despite official warning, the president of the Police-
men's Union, one Richard Meehan, held an interview with Asso-
ciated Press and New York Times reporters. During the interview
he made statements highly critical of the Governor's personnel
proposal. A week later, Meehan intensified his criticism by dis-
tributing copies of a letter and a poem that lampooned the Gov-
ernor. The letter urged each reader to write his congressman to
protest the hiring plan. Meehan was thereupon dismissed for con-
duct unbecoming an officer, disregard of a command not to talk
with the press, and failure to clear his statements with the Gov-
ernor's office. The court of appeals sustained the discharge under
Civil Service regulations.
The court first gave attention to the character and quality of
Meehan's statements. The poem they found an "intemperate lam-
poon" and the epithets in the letter had a "contemptuous quality."49
The opinion then turned to the second factor-the position of the
critic in the governmental hierarchy. Since Meehan was both a
police officer and an official of the union, his strategic place in the
Canal Zone service imposed upon him a special responsibility and
compelled a higher degree of loyalty than might reasonably be
required of others. Moreover, the case arose at a "tense and trou-
bled time and place" because of the turmoil in the Zone that led
to the gubernatorial decision to change police hiring practices.
These factors clearly differentiate Murray's case from Mee-
han's. Even if Meehan has survived the Supreme Court's holding
in Pickering unimpaired, which is doubtful, it does not control
Murray for several reasons. First, the position of the Peace Corps
in Chile during the summer of 1967 was certainly not so precarious
as to warrant special precautions or emergency restrictions on
speech. Second, whatever the general status of his branch of the
public service, Murray's own position in the hierarchy was so in-
sensitive and inconspicuous that his public statements would not
attract the attention naturally given to Meehan's statements about
the Canal Zone police. Nor would anyone, either in Chile or at
home, reasonably suppose that Murray had access to confidential
or secret information that would give his statements a credibility
not ordinarily due a person at his rank or level. A contrasting re-
view of these two cases thus suggests the relevance to the scope
of civil servant's first amendment rights of the position he holds
in the public service-not only his rank, but even more important
49 Id. at 836.
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the functional relationship between his position and the position
of those he criticizes.
c. Relation of the Speaker to the Source of Information. If
the critic's relationship to the object of criticism is relevant, ac-
count should also be taken of the proximity of the critic to the
information on which his criticism is based. Justice Marshall's
opinion in Pickering suggested that the case might well be different
if "a teacher has carelessly made false statements about matters
so closely related to the day-to-day operations of the schools that
any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter be-
cause of the teacher's presumed greater access to the real facts."50
Since the case itself involved a classroom teacher expressing views
on the use of funds for athletic programs, "the fact of employment
is only tangentially and insubstantially involved. . ... 51 These
comments suggest a possible formula for cases of this sort: the
scope of a public servant's freedom to criticize his superiors should
vary inversely with his proximity to confidential or privileged in-
formation, since the credibility of his charges would presumably
vary in direct proportion to such access.
There are, however, persuasive reasons for expanding rather
than contracting the privilege to comment as one approaches the
source of information. When Pickering. was before the Illinois
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Schaefer noted in his dissenting opin-
ion that "teachers are in closer contact with the actual operation
of the schools than anyone else and the public should not be de-
prived of their views." 2 Thus the public interest in permitting
criticism of official policy increases with proximity between critic
and information; the employee who attacks from the sidelines may
not be believed as readily as the man in the center, but there is
correspondingly less reason why anyone should believe him. It is
also true that the critic who has access to inside information can
do much more damage than one who is just guessing. Yet if the law
does not permit the man who knows the truth to disseminate it
with substantial latitude for distortion, then the truth may never
reach the public. The risk of falsification by one who knows better
50 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
51 Id. at 574.
52 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 36 II. 2d 568, 584, 225 N.E.2d 1, 10 (1967)
(dissenting opinion). Essentially the same conclusion was reached by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r of Baltimore, No. 149, Sept. Term
1969 (Md. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1970). In upholding the discharged police officer's
constitutional right to make critical statements about morale and efficiency within
the force, the court emphasized his opportunity "to speak freely on matters of public
importance, particularly matters as to which he had experienced expertise."
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is undoubtedly a substantial one, for all the obvious reasons. More-
over, the act of falsification by one holding such a position of trust
is particularly reprehensible. There may indeed be occasional cases
in which the insider should be given less latitude if, for example,
he distorts the truth for personal gain or out of sheer malice. Yet
in the typical case, Justice Schaefer seems to have the better of the
argument; the public interest in allowing the man who has access
to the information broad latitude in disseminating it outweighs the
interests of those who may be hurt by exaggeration or distortion
in the process.
d. Amount of Time Devoted to Protest Activity. There is a
further factor that might justify curtailment of criticism to protect
the internal efficiency and integrity of the public service. One can
imagine a disgruntled public employee becoming so involved in a
dispute with his superiors that the performance of his assigned task
suffers badly. Deterioration in his work may result either because
he cannot concentrate on the job when feelings about agency policy
are so intense, or because he simply devotes so much of his work-
ing day to politics that his formal duties are slighted. It was this
prospect that convinced Justice Frankfurter a decade ago that
Arkansas should be allowed to ask all public employees what or-
ganizations they belonged to each year.53 The governmental in-
terest in seeing that employees do stay on the job during working
hours and make the public service their primary commitment in
those hours cannot be gainsaid. Yet the enforcement of that in-
terest poses substantial threats of abuse as a device to remove
thorns from the side of a harried or timid administrator.
e. Effects of Restrictions on Agency Morale. Finally, there
is a latent conflict between short and long range assessment of
curbs on political activities of public employees. Restrictions that
do indeed promote the present efficiency of the civil service may
in the long run so undermine morale of those who are bound by
them that the efficiency of the institution will ultimately suffer.
The case of the Peace Corps provides the perfect illustration of
this tension. Murray suggested in his letter what might be the effect
on morale of the curbs he was attacking: "Part of the job of a
PCV is to give an opportunity to citizens of a foreign country to
know an American citizen in all the varied aspects of his person-
ality including his thoughts on important issues. . . . I find it a
contradiction for the Peace Corps to try to suppress any part of
the personality of the volunteer. . . ."'I As the letter suggests, re-
53 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 494-95 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
54 See Murray letter, supra note 7.
[Vol. 17:10281048
EMPLOYMENT, PROTEST, REVIEW
pressive restrictions of the sort that "angered" Murray and pro-
voked his responses are likely to alienate and embitter idealistic
young men and women who entered the Peace Corps with high
hopes and motives. 5
There is recent evidence of widespread support for Murray's
view of the effect of such restrictions. During the anti-Vietnam
War moratoria in October and November 1969, Peace Corps volun-
teers in many countries signed petitions and took part in other
forms of protest, fully aware of the risks.56 Three volunteers in
Turkey resigned after the regional director recommended their
dismissal for taking part in moratorium day demonstrations out-
side the United States Embassy in Ankara. Faced with such re-
prisal, they said they found their jobs "meaningless," and had
come to regard the Corps as "a clean, smiling commercial of Amer-
ican militarism, materialism, and racism. ' 57 Meanwhile, volunteers
in Bolivia, Columbia and the Dominican Republic paid for the
publication in newspapers and on local radio stations of an indict-
ment of the Vietnam War as "unjust and irrational" and calling
for United States withdrawal from South Vietnam. A spokesman
for the Dominican group, representing about half the volunteers
in that country, found a most enthusiastic response by citizens of
the host country. "For the first time," he observed, "many people
here have stopped looking on us as CIA agents.1
58
To a degree at least, the views of volunteers about their own
role were shared by former Peace Corps Director Jack Vaughn.
During testimony on an appropriations bill in the summer of 1968,
Vaughn expressed his belief that Corpsmen should not be required
to support United States foreign policy wherever they go. When
55 A similar view has recently been expressed by those in the field, who should be
in the best position to comment. About the time Murray was on his way back to
Washington, six Peace Corps Volunteers in Ecuador wrote a letter to the New York
Times voicing deep anxiety about the implications of the anti-war petition incidents:
Now, it effect, we have been ordered to support the war in Vietnam-
with our silence at least-as long as we remain connected to the Peace Corps.
. . . We have been partially deprived of our status as free agents, as repre-
sentatives of the American people rather than the American government.
This has damaged our relations with the people with whom we work. Many
of them who strongly distrust the American government had over the past
five years come to regard the Peace Corps as a special sort of organization;
and Volunteers as unusually sincere people... . Now the distinction between
the Peace Corps and other agencies of the United States has become blurred.
We are losing the confidence of many of the people we came here to help.
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1967, § 4, at 11, col. 3.
56 See Kent, Protestors in Peace Corps More Vocal, L.A.. Times, Nov. 18,
§ I at 13, col. 1.
57 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1969, § 1, at 113, col. 1.
58 See de Onis, Dominicans Hail War-Protest Ad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1969,
§ 1 at 13, col. 1.
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challenged by at least one hostile congressman, Vaughn invoked
repeated assurances by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that volun-
teers were "not a part of United States foreign policy, not to be
considered as such." 9 The authorizing statute supports this view
to a degree. It identifies the objectives of the Peace Corps as help-
ing international understanding and the manpower training needs
of the people of the host countries, rather than serving the tran-
scendent political interests of American foreign policy." Moreover,
the role that volunteers play in other countries identifies them
much less clearly as representatives of the United States than the
diplomatic personnel or non-diplomatic representatives of the State
Department, such as staff members of the Agency for International
Development. Thus restriction of free expression within the Peace
Corps may actually inhibit or jeopardize important interests, both
those in internal morale and commitment, and in relations with the
people of the country who are the intended beneficiaries of the
program.
2. The External Image and Neutrality of the Public Service
If the internal impact of criticism by a staff member is the
starting point, the external implications should not be overlooked.
Again the Peace Corps well illustrates both the legitimacy of the
government interest and the dangers of its abuse. The Corps has
a very substantial interest in avoiding friction6' with or em-
barrassment to policies and officials of the host country. It is not
hard to justify the Peace Corps' decision to send home a volunteer
in a newly independent African country who wrote on the back
of a postcard addressed to her parents how "primitive" and "un-
sanitary" she found conditions in the capital city. The government
was furious when someone in the post office intercepted the card
and transmitted the contents to the chiefs of state. The whole
Peace Corps program in that country would probably have col-
lapsed had not the incautious volunteer been dismissed forthwith.62
59 N.Y. Times, July 14, 1968, § 1, at 38, col. 1.
60 22 U.S.C. § 2501a (1964).
61 Indeed, Murray himself in his letter acknowledged that "the volunteer should
not meddle in the politics of the host country," but argued that this precept did not
apply "to the international politics of the U.S. which may be of interest to the host
country." See Murray letter, supra note 7.
62 For the first account of the highly embarrassing incident involving the rapid
termination of volunteer Margery Michelmore's service in Nigeria, see N.Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1961, § 1, at 10, col. 2.
The recent case of Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), dis-
cussed supra note 43, is highly relevant in this context. The court concluded that
Goldwasser's dismissal was justified in part because of the threat his highly charged
statements posed to relations between the United States and the friendly nations
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It it also possible to imagine a time so tense and troubled-rather
like the conditions in the Canal Zone that led the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit to affirm Meehan's discharge-that special emer-
gency strictures are necessary to preserve the neutrality of the
Corps. Following a clash between the United States and the host
country, for example, anti-American feeling might reach the point
where local reporters would be looking for ways to arouse their
readers still further by embarrassing the United States. In such a
case the regional director might be justified in forbidding, for the
duration of the emergency, the public issuance of certain deroga-
tory statements that would ordinarily be innocuous.
Save for emergency situations, however, it is hard to see how
statements about United States policy, unrelated to the politics and
policies of the host country, could invoke this interest in neutrality
and external image. Peace Corps workers in adjacent Southeast
Asian countries may well have less latitude to discuss Vietnam
policy than their counterparts in other areas of the world. Volun-
teers in Chile may be a bit less free to impugn United States policy
toward Latin America than are their colleagues on other con-
tinents. For the moment, however, the relevant cases involve no
such sensitive concerns. It will be time enough, when the case does
arise, to decide how far beyond host country politics the external
interest properly extends.
3. Clearance of Statements and Observance of Channels
Both Pickering and Meehan suggested a third set of govern-
mental interests. In Meehan, the court invalidated a requirement
that Canal Zone employees clear any statements to the press with
the Governor's office before releasing them-but only because the
rule was impossibly vague and probably had "lapsed for de-
suetude.'63 A footnote in Pickering wondered how far "teachers
can be required by narrowly drawn grievance procedures to submit
complaints about the operation of the schools to their superiors
for action thereon before bringing the complaints before the pub-
lic." 4 Recently the Supreme Court of Iowa struck down a clear-
from which his officer-students came. Judge McGowan concluded for the majority:
"We would also be blinking reality if we did not recognize that a class of foreign
military officers at an Air Force installation on invitational orders presents special
problems affecting the national interest in harmonious international relations. We are
certainly not equipped to second-guess the agency judgment that the instructional
goals of the Air Force program would be jeopardized by the teacher's volunteering
his views on subjects of potential explosiveness in a multi-cultural group." Id. at 1177.
68 Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
6 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 n.4 (1968).
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ance requirement as applied to firemen who publicized the issues
of a labor dispute in which they were involved. 65 Although a fire
department was necessarily a "semi-military organization," there
was no warrant for requiring clearance, under penalty of loss of
employment, "in the absence of a showing of impairment of public
service," which had not been made in that case.66
Justice Marshall's footnote in Pickering about "narrowly
drawn grievance procedures" cannot be dismissed as inadvertent.
Perhaps there is a governmental interest in requiring the dis-
gruntled employee initially to go through channels. Surely, how-
ever, the first amendment would not permit the channel to become
a dead-end street-or, for that matter, a maze. Two specific rules
might meet the constitutional guarantees now applicable to per-
sonnel policies in the public sector: one, a requirement that where
the employee really has a dispute with or claim against a particular
superior, he first pursue whatever internal remedies are available--
if they are adequate and responsive-before broadcasting his
grievance to the press or the community. This would represent
simply an application of the traditional exhaustion-of-remedies
rule, and would merely postpone, not destroy, the employee's right
to free speech. Second, the government might require that a copy
of any statement critical of the agency or its policies be delivered
to the agency head no later than the time of its release to the
media. Perhaps prior notification could even be required, to give
the agency time to prepare a reply. But surely "clearance" in the
usual sense of the term may not be made a condition of continued
public employment; the agency managers cannot constitutionally
be given a veto over statements critical of them and their policies.
Finally, as the court suggested in Meehan, any requirement of this
sort must quite precisely define its scope and application, so that
no reasonable doubts can arise as to who is covered or what kinds
of statements must be submitted. 8
4. Availability of Alternative Means to Serve Valid Governmental
Interests
A demonstration of legitimate, even compelling, governmental
interests no longer suffices where regulations on public employment
affect constitutional liberties. The courts have increasingly insisted
65 Klein v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1147, 152 N.W.2d 195 (1967).
66 Id. at 1157, 152 N.W.2d at 201.
67 See generally L. JAPTE, JuniciAL CoNTmoL or AnDmDmT AcTIoN 424-58
(abridged student ed. 1965).
68 Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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on the use of minimal regulation. "Even though the governmental
purpose may be legitimate and substantial," the Supreme Court
has consistently reaffirmed, "that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved."6 9
Application of this precept involves two inquiries-into the
nature of the governmental interest sought to be served on the one
hand, and into the narrower methods of implementation on the
other. The juxtaposition of these two facets of the Peace Corps
problem reinforces the conclusion reached by the Court. The Corps
has, as we have seen, a quite legitimate interest in preserving its
neutrality, and a less clear but still colorable interest in the over-
seas image of its activities. A regulation might be drawn to serve
only these interests, and to ensure as well a necessary degree of
internal discipline and unity. At the very least, volunteers could be
prevented from attacking publicly-in the local or the stateside
press-the policies or leaders of the host country. Further, under
Pickering the reckless or malicious issuance of false and defam-
atory statements about superiors could be made ground for disci-
pline. Perhaps false statements that are not reckless or malicious
could bring about a volunteer's dismissal if they seriously impair
the operations or activities of the Corps-if, for example, they so
undermine the confidence of host country officials in the regional
office that Washington is forced to close it down. Finally, penalties
could be provided for the unauthorized or premature divulgence of
certain highly confidential, sensitive or secret information, even if
the disclosures are factually accurate. But a regulation designed to
serve these three specific and legitimate governmental needs could
not constitutionally reach either substantially accurate but non-
confidential disclosures about the Peace Corps and its officials, or
general criticism of United States domestic or foreign policy unre-
lated to the host country. Thus the only regulations that could have
been drawn and enforced consistent with the first amendment
surely would not have covered Murray's case. The judgment in his
favor thus becomes conclusive by either of several routes.
A brief look at what has happened elsewhere in the public
sector confirms this judgment about the regulatory options avail-
able to the Peace Corps. The question of protest against the Viet-
nam War has arisen throughout the federal service during the past
69 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).




five years. The Civil Service Commission has taken a surprisingly
enlightened position; in April, 1968 Chairman John W. Macy
informed a group of irate congressmen that he would take no action
against federal employees who signed a petition protesting Ameri-
can involvement in Vietnam. "There is," he replied, "no law or
regulation that would prohibit most Federal employees from sign-
ing" such a petition, although it was destined for the White
House. 70 Even the army has recently adopted a benign view of pro-
test within the ranks. A memorandum issued in September, 1969
sets forth a number of important constraints on regulation of dis-
sent among the troops: distribution of a publication that is critical,
"even unfairly critical" of government policies, may not be barred
for that reason alone, but only for "cogent reasons." And a com-
mander in the field must obtain approval from Washington before
he does ban a publication on his base.7'
The new Army directive is hardly a model for the civilian sec-
tor. Undoubtedly many of the restrictions it continues would not
pass constitutional muster as applied to non-military employees.
Yet it is ironic that the Army has recognized what the Peace Corps
apparently has not-at least, had not at the time Murray's case
arose. Two points which emerge clearly from the Army memoran-
dum are absent from Peace Corps regulation. The first is that re-
strictions on speech should be drawn as narrowly as possible to
serve only essential needs and interests. Secondly, a reprisal for
protest or dissent which seems harsh or disproportionate, "rather
than serving as a deterrent, may stimulate further breaches of disci-
pline." One point is based on constitutional principle, the other on
practical needs of public administration. Both are important and
70 Recently, for example, Senator Sam J. Ervin charged that the Department of
Health, Education, & Welfare was requiring misconduct reports on staff members who
took part in demonstrations against the Vietnam War. HEW denied the charge, main-
taining that no such regulation exists presently or in contemplation. LA. Times,
Dec. 25, 1969, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
71 Moreover, servicemen may not be forbidden to frequent off-base coffee houses
unless the activities taking place there include "counselling soldiers to refuse to perform
duty or to desert or otherwise involve illegal acts with a significant adverse effect on
soldier health, morale or welfare." A commander may not punish soldiers who work
off-base, on their own time and with their own money on an underground newspaper,
"unless that newspaper contains material that is punishable under federal law." Finally,
civilians may not be denied a permit to demonstrate in public access areas on or adja-
cent to the base unless the demonstration would present "a clear and present danger
to loyalty, discipline, and morale." The rationale for the memorandum was to "safe-
guard the service member's right of expression to the maximum extent possible." The
Secretary observed, apropos of enforcement and reprisals, that "severe disciplinary
action in response to a relatively insignificant manifestation of dissent can have a
counter-productive effect on other members of the command," and should therefore
be avoided. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1968, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
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should give pause to agency heads in the civilian sector who feel
they need to curb all antiwar sentiments within their domains.
IV. PREINDUCTION REVIEW OF RECLASSIFICATIONS
Even if Murray's claim to reinstatement in the Peace Corps
is irrefutable, a finding in his favor on that issue will do him little
good if he has already been either inducted to active duty or im-
prisoned for refusing induction. Thus the essential corollary ques-
tion is whether he can (in the same or an ancillary proceeding)
obtain judicial review of the draft board's decision to withdraw
his II-A deferment because he originally lost the job on which that
deferment depended.
The Murray case does not directly raise the issue of review
prior to induction; Murray had already been called for induction,
had refused to step forward, and was under indictment at the time
he filed his civil suit. Thus the narrow question here is one of
access to the courts between induction and prosecution. While this
may be a somewhat less complicated issue to resolve, many of the
same considerations apply as in the preinduction context.
A. Availability of Pre-Prosecution Judicial Review
The necessary starting point on all such questions is the 1967
Selective Service Law amendment which provides that "no judicial
review shall be made of a classification or processing of any regis-
trant by local boards ... except as a defense to a criminal prosecu-
tion . ..after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or
negatively to an order to report for induction .... 172 The applica-
tion of the statute to the Murray suit is unclear. Murray had al-
ready responded (negatively) to an order to report for induction.
Yet by seeking to enjoin the reclassification (or recover his defer-
ment) he requested court review of a draft board decision by a civil
suit rather than "as a defense to a criminal prosecution." Although
the prosecution in which the claim could be raised precisely as stip-
ulated by the statute was already pending in the very same court,
it had not yet come to trial. Indeed, this criminal prosecution could
not come to trial until after disposition of the civil suit, since the
complaint included a prayer for injunctive relief against the United
States Attorney.
Despite the uncertainties, a compelling case for pre-prosecu-
tion review can be made. First, although this is not in fact the relief
72 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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that Murray sought, the statute clearly implies an exception for
civil review of reclassifications by habeas corpus petition.7 3 As the
Supreme Court has recently observed, although the statute "pur-
ports on its face to suspend the writ of habeas corpus ... everyone
agrees that such was not its intent."" Were the jurisdictional pro-
vision of the 1967 amendments construed to foreclose habeas cor-
pus, the most serious constitutional questions would arise. Typi-
cally, habeas corpus would be sought after conviction. But in the
draft context, there is at least one case recognizing the registrant's
peculiar dilemma and permitting habeas corpus after receipt of an
induction notice, since the strong possibility of indictment places
him in "constructive custody."75 Murray's case should follow a
fortiori, for Murray had already refused induction, been indicted
and was awaiting trial.7 Thus an exception must clearly be read
into the statute in such a case in order to spare a direct conflict
with the habeas corpus guarantee of the Constitution.
There is a second channel of judicial review that is presumably
open to a registrant in Murray's position: a motion to dismiss the
criminal charges on constitutional grounds. It could be argued, for
example, that reclassification based solely upon the exercise of a
registrant's first amendment rights may not constitutionally be
maintained. For even under the narrow standard of review govern-
ing draft prosecutions,7 such a claim would certainly warrant care-
ful consideration before setting the case down for trial.
Since two avenues of judicial review already exist in such a
case, it would appear a needless formalism to force the registrant
to maintain separate but concurrent proceedings in the same court
to try identical issues. Moreover, the maintenance of a single action
between indictment and prosecution would actually further, not
73 See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955) ; United States ex rel.
Reel v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1945).
74 Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968).
75 Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952). The registrant had re-
ceived an induction notice while studying at a medical school abroad, followed shortly
by a letter from the United States Attorney threatening indictment if the registrant
did not return promptly. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the
threat of indictment placed him in "constructive custody" even though the criminal
process had not yet begun. The court granted the petition on this ground. 105 F. Supp.
at 148.
70 Indeed, the Solicitor General in his brief in Oestereich argued against the need
for preinduction review partly on the ground that pre-prosecution review was available
by habeas corpus. "[A] registrant may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
immediately after induction." Brief for Respondents at 23, Oestereich v. Selective Serv.
Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
77 See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United
States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953) ; Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
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undermine, the very policies that underlie the statutory foreclosure
of preinduction review. The pertinent language of the Senate Com-
mittee Report on the 1967 amendments recalled the "original intent
that judicial review of classifications should not occur until after
the registrant's administrative remedies have been exhausted and
the registrant presents himself for induction. 7 8 The House Com-
mittee, a bit more precise, reaffirmed that "existing law ... clearly
precludes such a judicial review until after the registrant has been
ordered to report for induction and has responded either affirma-
tively or negatively to such an order."79 Therefore, to the extent
that legislative history controls-and these two reports contain
about all the legislative history that exists-there is nothing sacred
about deferring until trial of the criminal charges an adjudication
of the validity of a registrant's reclassification.
As the foregoing excerpts make clear, draftsmen of the 1967
amendments apparently saw two governmental interests jeopar-
dized by preinduction review: "[f] irst, [the statute seeks] to protect
the integrity of the Selective Service System. Therefore, a regis-
trant should exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review. Second, it wishes to prevent litigious interruptions of
the mobilization of manpower. As a result, a registrant should not
impede conscription by a premature resort to the courts.1 8° Granting
the legitimacy of both interests, and their relevance to judicial re-
view, neither appears to be subverted by allowing pre-prosecution
review in a case that has matured as far as Murray, where all avail-
able internal remedies had been exhausted within the Selective Ser-
vice System.8 Murray had even filed a late application for exemp-
tion as a conscientious objector, but the local board refused to
78 S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 10 (1967).
79 H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 30 (1967).
80 Note, Preinduction Judicial Review, 57 CALip. L. REv. 948, 985 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Preinduction Review].
81 Although the opinion of the court is rather sketchy on this aspect of the case,
the amended complaint recites the following sequence of events: On July 27, 1967,
Murray submitted to his local board a written request for reopening of his classifica-
tion so that he might receive a new occupational deferment. The basis for this request
was an offer he had received from the University of Concepcion to serve as. Professor
of Composition in the School of Music, notwithstanding his termination from the
Peace Corps. The board met on August 9, but failed to consider the request. A letter
sent to Murray the following day advised him that "the information recently sub-
mitted ... did not warrant reopening of your classification." Soon thereafter an appeal
was taken. On September 11 Murray was informed that the appeal had been rejected
by the Rhode Island Selective Service Appeals Board, apparently by unanimous vote.
The Government seems at no time to have argued any failure to exhaust remedies
available within the Selective Service System. For the recent views of the Supreme
Court on the issue of exhaustion of these remedies, see McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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reopen the classification by considering this request on its merits.
Thus whatever failure there may have been to review the case fully
within the Selective Service System was the board's fault, and not the
registrant's. Clearly, therefore, the civil suit could not fairly be dis-
missed for failure to exhaust internal administrative remedies. To
the contrary, the board's unexplained refusal to reopen after a
timely request for an alternative exemption from service actually
buttresses the case in favor of review at this point, since the pro-
cedural error was so egregious as to jeopardize the board's juris-
diction .2
Nor can judicial review of reclassification on the eve of a
criminal trial be said to interrupt the mobilization of manpower.
If anything, the expeditious interests of the Selective Service would
be enhanced rather than undermined by having all aspects of the
case settled in a single proceeding. The alternative, for which the
Government argued in Murray, would be to defer to a separate and
subsequent (or possibly concurrent) criminal proceeding all the
draft issues-with the virtual certainty of longer and more costly
litigation. If the Government lawyers did not see their own inter-
ests served by consolidating the issues, the court insisted that dis-
crete considerations of judicial efficiency decreed a single proceed-
ing. Moreover, the district judge stressed that "complete relief can
be obtained only if a court reaches the whole controversy." The
opinion continued:
Certainly, neither of the involved agencies can give to the complain-
ing party the whole relief he alleges to require .... [O]nly a court
can resolve the problem by unravelling the whole controversy and
adjudicating first the question first in line, that is, the allegedly
wrongful act of the other government entity and second, the question
next in line, that is, the board's classification.83
Thus many factors converge in support of consolidation of the sev-
eral claims presented by the Murray complaint. Without a statute
such as the 1967 amendment narrowing district court jurisdiction,
the propriety of a single lawsuit would be beyond question. Since
that amendment seeks to serve interests that are in no way jeopar-
dized by pre-prosecution review in such a case, any adverse implica-
tions from its language can readily be avoided. Thus Murray on its
82 The trial court observed in this regard: "[Pllaintiff has alleged that Local
Board No. 3 refused to reopen, not on any substantive basis, but only in order to
punish plaintiff for his previous First Amendment assertions. This allegation buttresses
plaintiff's claim of regulatory lawlessness by bringing it close to the category of cases
described by Mr. Justice Douglas in Oestereich as clearly reviewable in a pre-prosecu-
tion equity suit . . . ." Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 708 (D.R.I. 1969).
88 Id. at 702 (emphasis in original).
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facts falls far short of testing either the reach or the constitutional-
ity of section 10(b)(3).
B. Availability of Preinduction Review in a Murray-Type Case
If the facts of the Murray case do not really challenge con-gressional power to constrict judicial review, they at least suggest
the type of case that will introduce the hard questions. Let us as-
sume a situation substantially similar to Murray, in which review
of the reclassification is sought before the registrant actually re-ports for induction (and thus before the issue reaches the criminal
courts). If the registrant has lost his deferment because of a wrong-
ful expulsion from the Peace Corps, and has unsuccessfully pur-
sued his administrative remedies to regain the deferment, we have
a paradigm case within which to review the scope of recent deci-
sions under section 10(b) (3).s4
Since its enactment in 1967, this statute has been twice testedbefore the Supreme Court. Oestereich v. Selective Service Local
Board No. 11,1' involved a registrant who lost his exemption as a
ministerial student and was reclassified I-A delinquent because he
turned in his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. The Court
held that his preinduction suit could be maintained despite section
10(b) (3), because the draft board's act of reclassification was
"basically lawless."8 6 Given the need to imply one exception (forhabeas corpus) to the statutory foreclosure of review, the recog-
nition of another exception by which to reach draft board conduct
in violation of a congressional mandate was at least within reason.Since Oestereich's exemption derived from a clear statutory guaran-
tee,"7 any other result would allow the draft boards to flout congres-
sional will and leave the courts powerless to redress the most serious
grievances of registrants. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred with this
conclusion, although on a slightly narrower ground. To him the act
of reclassification involved in the case did not reflect the "discre-
tionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations" of a draftboard designed to be insulated from early review by section 10(b)(3).88 Three Justices dissented because they found the statutory
language so clear as to permit no exceptions other than the one
constitutionally compelled for habeas corpus." The dissenters
84 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
85 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
86 Id. at 237.
87 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (Supp. IV, 1969).
88 393 U.S. at 240.
89 Id. at 249-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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thought the line drawn by the majority between reviewable and un-
reviewable classifications both unworkable and disingenuous; they
doubted the majority's assurance that the decision left section
10(b) (3) "unimpaired in ... [its] normal operations .... ,,o
The scope of Oestereich cannot be understood without con-
sidering the related case of Clark v. Gabriel,91 decided on the same
day. In a memorandum opinion, without oral argument, the Court
reversed a district court decision granting preinduction review of a
denial of a conscientious objector claim. In contrast to Oestereich,
the Gabriel case left "no doubt of the Board's statutory authority
to take [the] action which [the registrant] challenges."92 The draft
board's action, moreover, "inescapably involve[s] a determination
of fact and an exercise of judgment."93 The presence of both these
vital ingredients made it unnecessary to decide which of them (if
either alone) was responsible for the different result in the two
cases.
It soon became apparent that in Oestereich and Gabriel the
Court had decided only the two easy cases lying at opposite poles.
Between them lay a broad range of cases involving determinations
less "discretionary" than Gabriel, but also less clearly "lawless"
than the reclassification in Oestereich. The difficulty in applying the
test, or deciding where to draw the line in this broad grey zone,
results from the uncertain nature of the Court's reasoning.
One commentator, remarking on the Court's failure to reach
the constitutional issues in either case, found the distinction be-
tween them "altogether disingenuous"; in his view, "Gabriel is
undoubtedly the clearest case for denying preinduction judicial
review in terms of the Oestereich analysis; at the same time, it is
the clearest for permitting preinduction judicial review in terms of
a constitutional. analysis."94 Another critic suggested that the line
drawn by the Oestereich majority found little support either in logic
or in legislative history, since "concern for the efficient operation of
the draft system implies either no review or review for a larger
class of plaintiffs: those who allege purely legal error in their classi-
fications. Claims of purely legal error can be disposed of with
greater dispatch than those involving questions of fact or mixed
law and fact."9 5
90 Id. at 238.
91 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
92 Id. at 258.
a Id.
94 Preinduction Review, supra note 80, at 973.
95 The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAiv. L. REv. 7, 264 (1969).
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The uncertain course charted by the lower federal courts in
the ensuing months suggested how unsatisfactory the "test" implied
by the two Supreme Court decisions proved to be. Federal district
judges disagreed, for example, as to whether Oestereich applied only
to statutory exemptions from military service, or might also be
utilized by those seeking to recover deferments based on equally
clear statutory language. 6 A second and ultimately more important
uncertainty had to do with the kind of draft board departure from
proper procedure that would warrant judicial intervention. The
opinion of the Court in Oestereich saw no occasion to go beyond
administrative acts clearly at variance with statutory mandate. But
Justice Harlan had suggested in his concurrence that review might
be appropriate wherever a clear legal error was alleged, even if a
patent statutory breach was not involved. Several lower courts ac-
cepted this invitation and broadened the exception accordingly. 7
Careful analysis of the two decisions confirmed that the excep-
tion had indeed swallowed the rule-that the dissenters were close
to the mark in doubting the majority's assurance that the statute sur-
vived "unimpaired in . . . its normal operations." There were a few
difficult cases, and many run-of-the-mill suits which (like Gabriel
itself) involved factual determinations clearly within the compe-
tence of the local board and vital to the deferment or exemption.
In these cases review was still clearly unavailable, for here the
literal application of section 10(b) (3) could not be questioned.
Only a holding that the statute was unconstitutional-something
the Court was clearly unwilling to do-would have opened the
doors of the district courts to suits of this type. But the bulk of
cases involving reclassification or acceleration of registrants for
protesting the Vietnam War (by turning in or destroying draft
cards, sitting in at draft boards, etc.) probably fell on the Oes-
tereich side of the line, within the logic of that decision if not its
words. Several ingredients suggested the appropriateness of review
in such cases. First, the status of the registrant-the basis of the
deferment or exemption-had not changed, and thus the reclassifi-
cation rested on extrinsic circumstances. Second, the action of the
draft board seldom if ever involved any sifting of facts, weighing
of evidence, or the like; the decision to withdraw the deferment or
declare a registrant "delinquent" was an almost automatic response
96 See, e.g., Foley v. Hershey, 409 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Stevenson v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 157, 303 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Turley v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 134, 301 F. Supp. 845, 852-53 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
97 See, e.g., Rich v. Hershey, 303 F. Supp. 177 (D. Colo. 1969); Wiener v.
Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 4, 302 F. Supp. 266 (D. Del. 1969) ; Itzcovitz v. Selec-
tive Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 301 F. Supp. 168, 178-80 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
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to receipt of information about the registrant's political activities.
Third, access to the courts in such cases would not be likely to im-
pede or disrupt the mobilization of manpower. Finally, these cases
presented substantial constitutional claims-typically that reclassi-
fication punished the registrant for exercising first amendment
rights-which would go unredressed unless early judicial review
was available. Thus all of the underlying policy considerations in
such cases pushed the line between the two Supreme Court deci-
sions far toward the Oestereich side. It is, therefore, hardly sur-
prising that many district courts found ways of granting review in
cases not clearly covered by Oestereich.8
Much of this uncertainty was put to rest by a second pair of
Supreme Court decisions about a year later. The first of these,
Gutknecht v. United States,99 held the whole "delinquency" proce-
dure unauthorized by the Selective Service Act, and thus confined
to the criminal courts the punishment of protest activity by regis-
trants. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, reviewed the history
of the delinquency regulations, rejected several proferred statutory
bases for them, noted the complete absence of standards for local
board discretion thereunder, and concluded that Congress had in-
tended that criminal prosecution should be the sole method of deal-
ing with registrants whose conduct renders them "delinquent"
under the Act. Acceleration of induction, particularly abhorrent as
a sanction where constitutional liberties were at stake, could not
be allowed without "a vast rewriting of the Act." 00
If Gutknecht provided one leg of the triangle of resolution,
the other two were supplied a week later in the companion case of
Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16.101 The registrant
was an undergraduate student who had lost his II-S deferment
after turning in his draft card during a protest meeting in the fall
of 1967. After being classified I-A delinquent, Breen brought suit
in the federal district court to enjoin his imminent induction. The
district judge'012 and the court of appeals10 3 thought the suit barred
by section 10(b) (3) and unaffected by Oestereick. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, with several Justices concurring on
special grounds.104 Since Gutknecht had already disposed of the
98 See cases cited notes 96-97 supra.
99 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
100 Id. at 307.
101 Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
102 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1968).
108 Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969).
104 Justice Harlan suggested the decision might better rest on the narrower
ground he had proposed in Oestereich, and which we have considered. See text accom-
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delinquency regulations on which Breen's reclassification rested,
the case for preinduction review was already substantially stronger
than it had been the previous year. Yet two hurdles remained: the
absence of a clear statutory command underlying the deferment;
and the distinction between an exemption (as in Oestereich) and a
deferment. The Court surmounted both with little difficulty.
Concededly, the statutory basis for student deferments' °5 is
less precise and peremptory than the foundation of ministerial (and
divinity student) exemptions.' °6 The Act does require the President
to prescribe "rules and regulations" for ordinary student defer-
ments; no such "discretion" is found in the section at issue in
Oestereich. But the Breen Court found the difference immaterial;
the delegation of authority contemplated merely "such additional
administrative procedures as the President may find necessary to
insure that all qualified students are given the deferment which
Congress provided .... ,"o7 Moreover, the 1967 statute had sought
to narrow the range of Selective Service discretion in the granting
or withholding of undergraduate deferments. Finally, there was
certainly no implication in the statute or its history that "such de-
ferred statu' could be denied because the registrant failed to pos-
sess his registration certificate.' 10 8
The Court made short work of the second hurdle as well.
Whatever technical differences there might be between exemptions
and deferments, it could not affect the scope of district court juris-
diction of preinduction suits. Instead, "the crucial distinction in
draft classifications is between individuals presently subject to in-
duction and those who are not so subject, either because of defer-
ment or exemption."' °9 Moreover, other portions of the statute
disclosed a congressional reluctance to make substantive rights
turn on the exemption-deferment distinction: those who were
"exempt" might in the future become subject to service, while
others who were only "deferred" might permanently escape mili-
tary duty.
The recent decisions in Gutknecht and Breen thus serve to
panying note 88 supra. Justice Brennan concurred (having dissented in Oestereich)
only because the force of that decision had settled the major issue in Breen. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart concurred in that part of the opinion dealing with
district court jurisdiction, but dissented (as they had in Gutknecht) with regard to
the delinquency regulations.
105 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
106 Id. § 456(g).
107 Id. § 456(h)(1).
108 Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 465 (1970).
109 id. at 466.
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confirm the early inferences about the reach of Oestereich. The
judgment that review is equally appropriate in Breen and Oester-
eich suggests two conclusions: first, that the range of cases between
Oestereich and Gabriel is very broad indeed, since those two deci-
sions merely defined the poles of a wide spectrum; second, that
most of the difficult and controversial cases fall on the Oestereich
side of the line permitting review, rather than on the Gabriel side
foreclosing it. Surely the reviewability of most cases involving anti-
war protest activities is much clearer both because Gutknecht has
set aside the basis for the reclassification, and because Breen opens
the doors of the federal courts to declare that classification invalid
before the registrant is forced to submit to a lawless or baseless
prosecution.
It is even worth speculating whether anything remains of sec-
tion 10(b) (3) but a hollow shell. The answer must be that a very
large number of cases remain unreviewable despite Oestereich and
Breen, and indeed, would be doubtful cases for review even if there
were no preclusive statute. These are the easy and obvious cases in
which the draft board has done what the Act contemplates-that
is, where the board engages in the process described by Justice
Harlan as "numerous discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact
determinations which a Selective Service board must make prior to
issuing an order to report for induction." 110 Gabriel itself is cer-
tainly one paradigm case. Even Justice Douglas, who has cham-
pioned judicial review in this context, concurred in the view that
the courts remain closed to registrants contesting the inferences
drawn or the weighing of the evidence in disputed factual cases.
Undoubtedly the vast majority of all classification decisions are of
this type, and thus remain unreviewable prior to a prosecution for
refusing induction. Yet here the exception is clearly far more im-
portant than the rule. Controversial cases in which draft boards
use their power to deter dissent, to enforce political orthodoxy, or
to impose their own predilections upon their registrants-are now
cognizable by the district courts almost without exception. It is the
occasional review of these cases that will help to keep draft boards
honest, and will check the worst abuses or excesses of the Selective
Service System.
The constitutional issue remains, of course. Even if the scope
of section 10(b) (3) is confined to its underlying purposes-requir-
ing exhaustion of internal remedies and avoiding disruptive litiga-
tion during mobilization of manpower-it may still be argued that
110 0estereich v. Selective ,Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 240 (1968).
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Congress cannot deny a civil remedy to any registrant. That issue
has, for the time being, been postponed because, with the sole
exception of Gabriel, the Court has taken only cases in which non-'
constitutional grounds of decision were entirely sufficient to gen-
erate exceptions to the statute. If and when the issue arises, it will
not be easy to resolve. It would be one thing if Congress had cut off
all judicial review, or had made the validity of classifications un-
reviewable in the prosecution for refusing induction. But that is
not what the statute does. It merely postpones review to a time at
,which the claim has matured-albeit at great cost and risk to the
registrant who wishes to contest his classification. Thus the issue
here is not whether to carve out one channel where Congress has
created none, but whether to recognize two channels where Congress
has provided one, on the ground that the one is constitutionally de-
ficient. However, for the moment it is more profitable to speculate
about the cases that have been decided than about the remaining
constitutional issues.
C. The Preinduction Analogy
Understanding of the scope of the recent decisions may be
enhanced by returning to the Murray-type hypothetical posed at
the outset. The outcome of such a case was left uncertain by Oes-
tereich and Gabriel. On the one hand, such a case would involve no
violation by the draft board of a statutory mandate. The granting
of a II-A deferment is highly discretionary, even under the perti-
nent regulations."' Not only is there no express provision for defer-
ment of volunteers, but the Peace Corps statutes in fact provide
that service in the Corps "shall not in any way exempt such volun-
teer from the performance of any obligation or duties under the
Selective Service Law.""' 2 Thus it could not be said a decision to
reclassify a volunteer in such a case would be "lawless" in the sense
that Justice Douglas used that term in Oestereich. On the other
hand, the local board action would involve none of the "discre-
tionary, factual, and mixed law-fact" determinations that Justice
Harlan deemed the basis of judicial deference to the administrative
judgment." 3 Neither the original withdrawal of the deferment, a
simple administrative error in Murray's case, nor the refusal to
restore that deferment would involve any sifting of facts, evalua-
tion of testimony or assessment of conflicting inferences.
If Oestereich is not dispositive of this hypothetical, neither
111 See 50 C.F.R. § 1622.23 (1969).
112 22 U.S.C. § 2520 (1964).
113 See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 240 (1968).
106519701
UCLA LAW REVIEW
is Breen. At the very least, Breen appears to preserve the require-
ment that a registrant seeking preinduction review demonstrate
draft board violation of a statutory command. Moreover, both
Oestereich and Breen involved punitive reclassifications under the
delinquency regulations since invalidated in Gutknecht . 4 Un-
doubtedly Breen contemplates availability of review for some non-
punitive actions of the Selective Service. But the case probably has
to be stronger where reclassification is not being used to punish
dissent, and where the special threat of accelerated induction is
absent. The case of a routine reclassification to I-A, which leaves
scheduling of induction to the regular order of call, is a weaker
one for dispensing with the "statutory violation" requirement at the
threshhold.
In two additional respects the Murray-type preinduction case
would be harder than Oestereich or Breen. For one, the challenged
action in the Murray-type case would not be the routine draft
board decision to withdraw or terminate a deferment. Rather, it
would be an administrative refusal to restore a deferment that had
expired in ordinary course. Second and more important, Oestereich
and Breen (like most delinquency cases) involved the withdrawal
of a deferment or exemption for conduct that was irrelevant to the
dispensation from military service. Where a student remains a stu-
dent but turns in or destroys his draft card, the legality of the
board's action in terminating his deferment is clearly more vulner-
able than where the board acts because the student has been ex-
pelled from or dropped out of college. In the Murray-type case, by
contrast, the draft board's refusal to reopen would be predicated
upon the seemingly regular termination of a tour of draft-exempt
Government service.
Thus Breen leaves Murray unresolved. Had the draft board
carefully reviewed Murray's record in the summer of 1967 and
decided that teaching Chileans to compose and perform music was
no longer "necessary to the maintenance of the national health,
safety or interest" '115 or that there no longer existed the requisite
shortage of persons possessing these particular pedagogical skills," 6
a decision to cancel the deferment would clearly be of the sort that
Gabriel held unreviewable before prosecution. Had the local board
made a general policy decision that Peace Corps service no longer
merited an occupational deferment, reclassification would seem
114 Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
115 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22(a) (1969).
110 Id. § 1622.23(a)(2).
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equally unreviewable even though no factual determinations would
be involved in the individual case.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the Peace Corps erroneously
reported Murray's termination of service to his local board, having
in mind a completely different Bruce Murray in another part of
the world who had in fact been terminated. A literal reading of
Oestereich, even as expanded by Breen, might hold the refusal to
reinstate a II-A deferment in these circumstances immune from
preinduction review. Yet if the board refused to correct sua sponte
the consequence of a clear mistake as to identity, it seems obvious
that a district court should have jurisdiction to compel such rectifi-
cation. However explicit the terms of section 10(b) (3) may be,
they cannot mean that a court is powerless to correct a "lawless"
act simply because no clear statutory command has been breached.
None of the underlying policies of the Selective Service System
would be jeopardized by judicial intervention prior to induction in
such a case, nor would there be any need for the court to encroach
on the board's discretionary or facf-finding functions.
The preinduction Murray case we have hypothesized seems
much closer to the case of mistaken identity than to one involving
reevaluation of general deferment policies or individual eligibility.
If a court found that a registrant had been unlawfully expelled
from the Peace Corps, would that not be tantamount to finding that
the man admittedly expelled was a different Murray altogether?
Here, as with the mistaken identity case, all factors favor review:
there are no additional remedies to be exhausted; no draft board
discretion is involved; and the efficiency of the Selective Service
would in no way be impaired.
Moreover, a denial of district court jurisdiction in such a case
might well revive the constitutional issue so neatly skirted in
Oestereich and Breen. If Murray were told that he had a constitu-
tional right to reinstatement in the Peace Corps, but that there
was no way to vindicate that right because no court could order
restoration of his deferment, and thus relieve the pressures of a
beckoning military obligation, then his first amendment rights
would be left without meaningful legal protection. His undoubted
constitutional right to criticize United States foreign policy while
serving the Government, and his right to question Peace Corps
procedures while working as a volunteer, would then become value-
less abstractions. In the case of volunteers not subject to the draft,
and draft-vulnerable young men whose local boards respected the
constitutional guarantees of dissent, these rights would be pro-
tected. But for others, like Murray himself, the very scope of the
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right to speak while in Government service would be dependent
upon the crude administrative fiat of a local draft board. Thus the
argument for subjecting local board judgment on such matters to
judicial review becomes quite compelling. It may well be that sec-
tion 10(b) (3) unconstitutionally restricts district court jurisdiction
in any case. 17 But surely it cannot be construed to close the doors
of the federal courts to preinduction review where judicial interven-
tion at that stage affords the only remedy for a government em-
ployee unconstitutionally dismissed by another agency and thus
delivered to the Selective Service System.
The greatest importance of Murray may well lie in other con-
texts outside of governmental employment. The number of cases in
which a loss of status in one area will lead to reclassification by the
Selective Service System is enormous, and it is not difficult, for
example, to see the applicability of Murray to the student protestor,
who is expelled from school by procedures in violation of school
regulations, and then pounced upon by the Selective Service Sys-
tem. For the student, and for others in similar "double loss" situa-
tions, review in a civil suit before prosecution in a criminal case is
a most feasible alternative."' The arguments in support of this
suggestion would be substantially those just reviewed in the govern-
ment employment context. Review would, on the one hand, jeopar-
dize none of the governmental interests sought to be protected by
section 10(B) (3); while on the other hand, denial of early review
would raise the most basic doubts about the constitutionality of
the statute, since the expelled student, clearly entitled to reinstate-
ment, would be left without an adequate remedy in any forum. Ajudgment in the student's favor by the university disciplinary ap-
peals committee, or by a court reviewing the suspension or expul-
sion, would be small consolation to one who is either in basic train-
ing or in jail for refusing induction." 9
117 See, e.g., Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 703-13 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd
per curiam, 411 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1969); Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895,
898-902 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); O'Neil, Review of Selective Service Reclassifications, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 547-56 (1969).
118 Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 702 n.9 (D.R.I. 1969).
119 Similar remedies might also be available to a registrant wrongfully expelled
by a private college or university, or improperly discharged by a private employer. If
the private primary beneficiary either voluntarily reinstated the benefit, or if its acts
were held to be sufficiently governmentally affected or supported to constitute "state
action," district court jurisdiction might then be available. Certainly the policy con-
siderations favoring review are equally compelling, and the interests of the Selective
Service no different. For a discussion of this issue as applied to private universities
and colleges, see H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PENUMBRA (1969). For discussion of similar issues in the context of private employ-
ment, see Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of




Cases involving termination of two interdependent government
benefits merit special attention and require particular solicitude by
the courts, both because of their complexity and because of the im-
portant individual liberties typically at stake. Murray forcefully
illustrates and underscores that the need for vigilance and judicial
sensitivity is especially great in this context, because of the drastic
consequences of insulating Selective Service decisions from judicial
review.
The conclusions which emerge from analysis of a particular
juxtaposition of two important government benefits-Peace Corps
service and temporary immunity from military service-are quite
consistent with the general principles we posited at the start. It may
be well to return to those principles by way of conclusion. Where
the withdrawal of a primary benefit brings about or permits the
forfeiture of a secondary or dependent benefit, the case for judicial
review of the secondary termination is compelling after the primary
benefit has been restored. There is a special urgency for judicial
review in the presence of any of three additional factors: first, if
the withdrawal of the primary benefit infringes the beneficiary's
constitutional rights and liberties; second, if the cancellation of the
secondary benefit follows automatically from the termination of
the first, with no intervening assessment of the beneficiary's con-
tinuing eligibility; and third, if the principal importance of the
primary benefit is as a means of access to a secondary benefit which
the claimant would otherwise be denied.
All three elements appear to characterize the Murray case,
and thus make the claim for judicial review unusually strong.
Clearly the first two factors are present. The termination of Mur-
ray's Peace Corps status infringed his first amendment liberties of
expression in the most serious way, and the withdrawal of his de-
ferment (or the refusal to reinstate it) followed automatically from
the expiration of Peace Corps service. The third element is prob-
lematical. It may well be that continued deferment from the draft
was relatively unimportant in Murray's case, though many volun-
teers' motives have been at least mixed in this regard. If escaping
the draft was not the primary inducement for joining the Peace
Corps, however, the case is not necessarily weakened, for surely
Murray's claim to full court review should not suffer because his
primary motivation was to further the cause of world peace or to
bring to the people of Chile the enjoyment of fine music.
(1952). See generally Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN.
L. REv. 620 (1958).
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